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BUFFALO LAIV REVIEI
Gambling
Lotteries, pool-selling, book-making, and any other kind of gambling except
42
pari-mutuel betting on horse races, is prohibited by the New York Constitution.
However, this provision is not self-executing, and a particular transaction is not
a crime until made so by statute.43 Pool-selling, book-making, and so forth, are
4
specifically made misdemeanors by the Penal Law, §986.44 In People v. Farone 6
the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, receiving and becoming the custodian
of money bet and wagered in connection with roulette and dice games, in violation
of §986. The prosecution maintained that the wording of §986 was broad enough
to cover roulette and dice,46 however, the Court rejected this contention and
reversed the convictions.
It felt that such an interpretation of the statute would greatly extend the
scope of our penal laws against gambling, and would result in their application
to the non-professional gambler. The statute is aimed at the professional gambler,
not the casual bettor.47 Casual betting or gambling by individuals, as distinguished
from professional gambling, is not a crime.48 By extending this anti-booking
statute to cover other professional gambling activities, there is danger that nonprofessional bettors will be included as well; therefore it is necessary to construe
it strictly in favor of the accused.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Abandonment
After a hectic early period of marriage, a wife left her husband to go home
to her mother, and shortly thereafter offered to return to him. This offer was
refused, and the wife sued for separation on the ground of abandonment. The
husband counterclaimed for separation on the same ground. Judgment was
rendered for the wife.'
While the Civil Practice Act establishes abandonment as a ground for
separation, 2 it does not define the exact requirements for such an abandonment.
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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
Courts have generally held that abandonment must be persistent and stubborn,
rather than an isolated act.3 An offer to return, if made in good faith within a
reasonable time after the original act, will relieve the abandoner. 4 As a consequence, when a wife makes an offer to return, the husband must accept the offer
or thereby abandon her.5
Although the trial court had rendered judgment for the husband in the
instant case, the Appellate Division found that the wife's offer was made in good
faith and within a reasonable time (two weeks) after leaving, so her actions did
not constitute an abandonment, since they had not "frozen. into a permanent
attitude"; the judgment of the trial court was therefore reversed, 6 leaving the
parties in their original position.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the Appellate Division, and
determined that since the wife's actions did not constitute an abandonment the
husband was bound to accept her offer to return, and his failure to do so constituted an abandonment on his part.
A dissent voted to affirmn the judgment of the Appellate Division. Although
neither the opinion of the Court of Appeals nor the memorandum decision of the
Appellate Division gives a full account of the facts, the dissent would seem to be
unfounded, since the facts as given leave no doubt that an abandonment did take
place and the question would seem to be only which party was at fault.
Support and Remarriage
Plaintiff wife had been married to defendant; a divorce was granted her with
provisions for support as previously arranged in a separation agreement, until
she should die or remarry. Five years later she did remarry, and so advised
defendant. Subsequently her second marriage was annulled, on the grounds that
her husband was still legally married, and after a short time she brought this suit
to renew her support from her first husband. Judgment was rendered for the
husband
The basic problem before the Court was whether a marriage declared a
"nullity" could still constitute a remarriage for purposes of the support provisions.
The Court was faced with their decision in Sleicher v. Sleicher,8 which had decided
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